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ASSESSMENT AND COMPARISON OF 
LIQUEFIED ENERGY GAS TERMINAL RISK 
Christoph Mandl and John Lathrop 
CHAPTER 1: 
E3xCUTTYE SUMMARY* 
This report has two main goals: 
1. To present and compare the various procedures of risk assess- 
ment as they have been applied to  liquefied energy gas (LEG) 
terminal siting, and in doing so to clarify the limits of knowledge 
and understanding of LEG risks. 
2. To quantify and compare the risks a t  four LEG terminal sites, 
namely Eemshaven (Netherlands--NL), Mossmorran (United 
Kingdom-UK), Point Conception (USA), and Wilhelmshaven 
(Federal Republic of Germany--D). 
*The research reported in this paper is supported by the  Bundesministerium fuer Forschung 
und Techologie, F.R.G., contract no. 321/7501 /RGB 8001. While support for this work is 
gratefully acknowledged, the views expressed are the author's own, and are not necessarily 
shared by the sponsor. 
The major findings of this report can be summarized as follows: 
1. There is no unique concept of risk that is used throughout all 
the risk assessment reports examined in this study. Many of the 
important differences between the reports stem from the dif- 
ferent risk concepts used. Some reports do not even define 
their underlying risk concepts. However, there is a concept of 
risk that involves several measures, each based on both proba- 
bilities of failures and consequences of failures, that is judged to 
be superior to other less comprehensive risk concepts. 
2. The possible failures of the system, the probability of those 
failures and the estimation of their consequences to life and 
limb differ between the reports. Not all the differences can be 
explained by differences between the terminals and sites; some 
must be viewed as resulting from the limited knowledge and 
understanding of LEG risks. In t h s  respect too little reference 
is made to remaining uncertainties in the estimation of risk in 
most reports. 
3. Given the differences between the reports there is no relative 
tendency for each report individually to over- or underestimate 
the risk. Rather each report is more conservative on certain 
topics and less so on other topics as compared to the other 
reports. Thus no report can be singled out as producing a more 
conservative estimate of the risk (with respect to all parts of the 
total risk) than all the other reports. 
4. On a relative risk scale it can be said that among the four sites 
Point Conception is the terminal with the lowest risk (because of 
very low population density), Mossmorran and Wilhelmshaven 
are the two terminals with the hghest  relative risk (because of 
high population density and more vessel traffic) and Eemshaven 
is in between. However, t h s  does not imply anything at  all 
about absolute risk. 
5. Although risk is an important dimension of the decision to 
import LXG and to choose a specific site for the terminal, it 
should not be forgotten that other dimensions, like reliability, 
are important too. Any decision regarding LEG importation and 
terminal siting should involve comparisons with alternative 
options. As part of that process the risk of LEG should be com- 
pared with the risk of other options. 
6. Whatever flaws the LEG risk assessments may have, they are 
clearly superior to less systematic ways to identify possible sys- 
tem weaknesses and inform the decision making process on the 
topic of risk. 
This paper is the first part  of a research report. The second part will 
specifically address the problem of giving guidelines to evaluate LEG ter- 
minal risk assessment reports and in particular to evaluate the risk 
assessment reports for the four terminal sites under study. 
CHAPTER 2: 
LNTRODUCTION 
2.1. BACKGROUND, PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
In the last decade a new technology for transporting and storing 
natural gas has become increasingly important for the overall energy 
supply of industrialized countries. The central idea of this new technol- 
ogy is to reduce the temperature of natural gas below -162'~, a t  which 
point natural gas becomes a liquid with a six-hundreth the volume of the 
gas. The advantage of liquefied natural gas (LNG) is that it  can be tran- 
sported and stored efficiently in tanks due to its high energy per unit 
volume. Only in liquefied form can natural gas be transported via ships 
from supply points in Indonesia, Algeria, and other countries to demand 
points in the U.S., Europe, and elsewhere with reasonable costs. 
However, due to the extreme temperatures of LNG i t  is necessary to 
build special shps ,  special terminals to transfer LNG to and from the 
ships and special tanks on land to store LNG. Cost considerations made it 
necessary to plan and build LNG vessels and LNG terminals of consider- 
able size. A typical LNG vessel can contain 125,000m3 LNG. A t  LNG ter- 
minals up to 60,000m3 LNG is transferred per day (which is equivalent to 
an energy flow of approximately 15,000 Megawatts--the power of about 15 
standard nuclear reactors) and terminal storage tanks are planned to 
contain up to 500,000m3 LNG. It is therefore not surprising that this &h 
concentration of LNG at  the site of a terminal created concern that there 
mlght be potential negative effects, particularly to the environment and 
to the local population. 
Th.~s report in fact covers a broader category of terminals than those 
handling LNG. One of the terminals examined is to handle liquefied pro- 
pane and butane, substances which involve many of the same risk assess- 
ment features and problems as LNG involves. Since all of these sub- 
stances, liquefied methane, propane, and butane, are called liquefied 
energy gasses (LEG), the terminals examined in this study will be 
referred to as LEG terminals. Although there are many aspects involved 
in assessing the advantages and disadvantages of an LEG terminal a t  a 
specific site, the risk to the local population turned out to be one of the 
crucial questions. Because of a lack of hstorical data on accidents at  
LEG terminals, the frequency of such accidents as well as their conse- 
quences to people cannot be readily estimated. Therefore, over the past 
7 years attempts have been made to quantify the risk to the local popula- 
tion for different planned LEG terminals, using different techniques and 
models with different results. 
It is the purpose of this report to carefully review the risk assess- 
ments undertaken for four LEG terminals in four &fferent countries, to 
discuss their plausibilities, explain the differences and compare the 
estimated risk. Where necessary and appropriate we will also attempt to 
expand the risk assessment reports. Because LEG terminal risk assess- 
ment is a new technique, there is still some disagreement among experts 
as to how to quantify risk, wbch models to use, what to include in a risk 
assessment and what to exclude. 
There are two main goals whch  the authors hope to achieve with t h s  
report: 
1. To present and compare the various procedures of risk assess- 
ment as they have been applied to liquefied energy gas (LEG) 
terminal siting, and in doing so to clarify the limits of knowledge 
and understanding of LEG risks. 
2. To quantify and compare the risks a t  four LEG terminal sites, 
namely Eemshaven (Netherlands--NL), Mossmorran (United 
Kngdom-UK), Point Conception (USA), and Wilhelmshaven 
(Federal Republic of Germany--D) . 
Clearly, no pretense is made that  this report provides complete or 
final answers concerning comparative risks, risk assessment roles or 
standards. Rather, thls report describes some initial attempts to address 
important problems in the field of risk assessment. 
2.2. RISK, PROBABILITIES AND CONSEQUENCES 
Before it is possible to quantify risk, we must define it. It will 
become apparent in this section that different peopl- mean different 
things when they talk about risk. Therefore our definition, actually a set 
of definitions, cannot be descriptive but rather will be prescriptive. 
It is good to admit at the outset of t h s  discussion that risk is an 
essentially troublesome concept from the point of view of evaluation. 
Ideally, if one adopts the axioms of rational choice under uncertainty, the 
evaluation of any decision alternative should consider the probability dis- 
tribution over the consequences which result from that alternative, whch 
may be expressed in a space of several dimensions (see, e.g., LUCE-GEN in 
the acronym coded reference section). Yet the concept of risk singles 
out a subset of those dimensions for special analysis. The term is typi- 
cally applied to particular uncertain costs, diverting attention from 
other costs and uncertain benefits that could be just' as important for 
evaluation. In the case of LEG importation, for example several dimen- 
sions are of concern for site selection and facility design, as are listed in 
the next section. Of those, several involve uncertain costs, for example, 
financial losses to the applicant if anything goes wrong (delay in applica- 
tion approval, loss of source contract, ship accident), environmental 
losses due to accidents or even routine disruption, fatalities and injuries 
due to accidents, property losses due to accidents, and losses to consu- 
mers from natural gas supply interruption if anything goes wrong (these 
losses include unemployment and health effects in an extreme winter). 
While all of these uncertain costs could be and are referred to as risks. 
and all of them could be analyzed by techniques of risk assessment, in 
fact the term risk assessment in the context of LEG typically refers only 
to assessments of uncertain loss of life due to accidents. That is the 
scope for all risk assessments reviewed in t h s  report. 
One could try to argue that the narrow scope of application of the 
risk assessments reviewed here reflects a judgment that externalities 
involving loss of life deserve special attention. However, other LEG effects 
lose and save lives: a supply interruption in a severe winter can cost 
lives; an increased share of clean-burning natural gas in the energy sup- 
ply can prevent early deaths due to air pollution. It seems, then, that  the 
scope given to risk assessments is an  implicit acknowledgment that spe- 
cial attention should be given to assessing the possibility of accidental 
and/or catastrophic loss of life. We shall call t h s  particular focus the 
political perspective of risk, in reference to the fact that realities of the 
political process of risk management include a special sensitivity to that 
form of loss of life. It follows that the definition of risk adopted here 
should be compatible with that focus of attention. 
There is an extensive literature studying what we have called the pol- 
itical perspective of risk (see, e.g., SLOV-GEN). That literature identifies 
particular dimensions of importance in describing risk from that  per- 
spective. In addition to the possibility of catastrophe itself, the inequity . 
of the burden of risk is important, as is whether or not risk is occupa- 
tional, and how risk to an individual compares with other risks commonly 
experienced. It is beyond the scope of t h s  report to develop a 
comprehensive, single measure of political-perspective risk. However, in 
choosing a definition of risk, we should be responsive to that  perspective 
and be sure to select as risk measures ones that capture these concerns. 
With t h s  as a background, the best way to develop a definition of risk 
is to start  by quoting some of the definitions from the risk assessment 
literature (see reference section for acronym-report codes): 
SAI- USA: "Risk is the expected number of fatalities per year 
resulting from the consequences of an accidental event." 
CREM- UK: "Risk is the probability of an injurious or destructive 
event, generated by a hazard, over a specified period of time." 
BATTE2- OTH: The group risk is defined as "the frequency a t  
whch certain numbers of acute fatalities are expected from a 
single accident." The risk to the society as a whole is defined as 
"the expected total numbers of acute fatalities per year result- 
ing from accidental events in the system." 
KEEh- OTH: "Societal risk-total expected fatalities per year; 
Individual risk--probability of an exposed i n d i ~ d u a l  becoming a 
fatality per year; Group risk--probability of an individual in a 
specific exposed group becoming a fatality per year; Risk of 
multiple fatalities--probability of exceeding specific numbers of 
fatalities per year." 
It is of interest to note that these quotes are the only definitions of risk 
found among all of the risk assessments reviewed in t h s  study. In all 
assessments not mentioned above, risk is assessed without ever being 
explicitly defined. In addition, in one of the quoted cases, SAI-USA, other 
summary measures are given, includmg risk of multiple fatalities, that 
are not included in the quoted definition. The general presumption of 
most of the risk assessments seems to be that risk is a multi-dimensioned 
concept that can be adequately described to a decision maker by various 
sets of numbers, without an explicit definition of what risk is. 
Although the quoted definitions differ quite substantially, in most 
cases they agree a t  least to the extent that risk is related to the probabil- 
ities of certain events and to the consequences these events might have 
(in terms of number of fatalities). 
Surveying the set  of risk assessments reviewed in t h s  study, one can 
identify two extreme definitions of risk. One extreme, given by the risk 
definition of CREM-UK, considers probabilities of destructive events only 
and does not look at  the consequences these events can have. This 
approach is only practical as a non-evaluative description of the risk of a 
facility. Such an approach only makes sense for comparison or evalua- 
tion in the very limited case when all destructive events have equally- 
valued consequences, and risk is defined as the probability that any one 
of the events would occur in a given time interval (or expected number of 
events in that interval). It would be clearly meaningless to label two facil- 
ities equally risky if they had equal probabilities of an accident, but the 
accident in one facility had much more serious consequences than the 
accident in the other facility. 
On the other extreme, risk can and is some times viewed as the worst 
possible event (with the most serious consequences). Again we would 
argue that comparing t h s  h n d  of risk is not meaningful because it omits 
the probability of an  event and thus the relevance of such a worst possi- 
ble event. 
The underlying concept of this report is based on the axioms of 
rational choice under uncertainty referred to before, i.e., that any evalua- 
tion of the risk of a decision alternative should depend upon the probabil- 
ity distribution over consequences that results from selecting that alter- 
native. While descriptions of political choice behavior may deviate in 
important ways from the rational choice paradigm, this report adopts an 
essentially prescriptive perspective, while remaining sensitive to the pol- 
itical perspective of risk as described before. We do t h s  by adopting 
definitions of risk that address political perspective concerns. These 
definitions, used throughout this report, are the ones described by Kee- 
ney et  al. (KEEN-OTH): 
- Societal Risk: Total expected fatalities per year. 
- Individual Risk: Probability of an exposed individual becoming a 
fatality per year. 
- Oroup Risk: Probability of an individual in a specific exposed 
group becoming a fatality per year. 
- Risk of mult iple  fatali t ies:  Probability of exceeding specific 
numbers of fatalities per year. 
As we will discuss in more detail in chapter 4.5.1., each of these 
definitions addresses a different aspect of the political perspective of 
risk. However, they are interrelated. They can all be derived from the 
same basic set of data: the annual probability distribution over accidents 
and the conditional probabilities that each exposed individual will be 
killed by each accident. In practice, that data set typically takes the 
form of conditional probabilities that particular geographic regions are 
exposed to various physical effects, combined with population density 
data for each region. That data can be used to calculate the probability 
distribution over number of fatalities, whch in turn yields the risk of mul- 
tiple fatalities and the societal risk, as defined above. The same data can 
be used to calculate the annual probability that each exposed individual 
will become a fatality. The sum of those probabilities is the societal risk; 
the average over all exposed individuals is the individual risk; and the 
average over each of various groups of individuals, classified by location 
or occupation (e.g., LEG terminal employee), is the group risk for each 
group. 
Two important aspects of accident risk are not included in these 
definitions: injuries and property damage. There is one argument to jus- 
tify these omissions: the kind of accidents we are dealing with are charac- 
terized by closely interrelated fatalities, injuries and property damages. 
Risk measures based on fatalities can be taken as good relative indicators 
for all three types of risks, so long as all evaluated alternatives have simi- 
lar ratios between fatalities, injuries and property damage. We are not 
saying that this condition holds for the LEG terminals studied here. The 
information available to us is not adequate to test  the validity of such an 
assumption. 
The definition of risk adopted here is by no means an ideal one or 
universal one. Various readers from particular orientations may have 
other definitions that they find more suitable for their purposes. How- 
ever, our definition requires the estimation of consequences and the pro- 
babilities of consequences, two activities which are topics of the bulk of 
t h s  report. Any reader with almost any definition of risk will be 
concerned with one or both of these topics, and so will find the report 
relevant to assessments of risk as he defines it. 
2.3. LEG TERMINAL RISK ASSESSMEXT AS A DECISION AID 
Given the orientation of this report,  it  is easy to forget that  a risk 
assessment is not an end unto itself, but in fact is only one element of the 
complex process of LEG facility siting and design. More importantly, a 
risk assessment is supposed to be a decision aid for one or more of the 
decisions that  must be made within that  process. An understanding of 
where a risk assessment fits withn an LEG siting and design process is 
essential to the understandmg of the adequacy and worth of a risk assess- 
ment as a decision aid. 
An LEG siting and design process can be described as part of a 
hierarchy of decisions. As an example, consider the hierarchy for impor- 
tation of LNG. At the hghest  level is the decision concerning how much to 
expand the national energy supply. Then there is the decision concerning 
how much to expand the amount of natural gas within that  total. Then 
the sources of that  natural gas must be identified: domestic, foreign via 
pipe, foreign via LNG. If it is decided that  a new LNG facility is desirable, 
then the site must be selected, and the detailed design of the facility 
developed. There are two features of such a hierarchy of particular note 
here. First: risk to life and limb is only one dimension of concern for the 
decisions listed. Other dimensions include cost, land use environmental 
quality, air quality benefits of natural gas, and dependence on foreign 
sources. There is even another important dimension involving risk: 
supply interruption risk due to shortage, embargo, accident, earthquake, 
or weather preventing berthing. 
The second notable feature of the decision herarchy is the inter- 
dependence of the decisions. While the top-down order in whch the deci- 
sions were listed may approximate the typical chronological order, in fact 
each decision depends on the outcomes of decisions below it. For exam- 
ple, the decision to select LNG as a new source of gas depends on cost and 
risk figures that are functions of the site and des~gn used. In fact, if it 
were not for that interdependence, the top three decisions would not be 
relevant to this paper, which concerns itself with reports on terminal sit- 
ing and design. It follows that the decisions are made in an involved 
order, as tentative decisions based on uncertain estimates shuffle down 
the herarchy and feedback shuffles back up. 
Given the several decisions in the hierarchy that must be made that 
involve risk dimensions, it would seem that there are several roles for 
risk assessment in LEG facility siting and design. Yet the processes stu- 
died in our research have narrowed that role down to a single application: 
on one dimension, risk to Me and limb; at  one level, siting or design 
(depending on the country). There are several effects of t h s  narrowing. 
To begin with, it diverts analytic effort and political attention away from 
those questions not addressed by risk assessment. For example, supply 
interruption risk could be a significant factor in the California case, given 
the energy throughput (equivalent to about 15 nuclear reactors), the 
storage capacity, and average ship arrival rate. A supply interruption 
could be caused simply by weather. Yet that problem did not receive 
nearly the attention that accident risk to life and limb did, even though it 
could have been a factor in site selection. In fact, supply interruption 
risk (due to shortage) was the chief argument for initiating the LNG 
application in the first place, and so was apparently an important con- 
sideration. 
A second effect of the narrow role given risk assessment is that the 
level at  which it is applied affects how it is conducted. When risk assess- 
ment is part of the site selection process, as in California, a particular 
facility design is assumed, and analytic effort concentrates on such 
things as shpping traffic and local population density as site-specific 
inputs in a calculation of population risk. When risk assessment is part of 
the facility design process, as in the FRG, the site is assumed fixed, and 
the analysis considers the sizes, arrangements and specifications of com- 
ponents of the facility. In that case technical variations on the design are 
considered in terms of incremental reductions of risk. 
There is a t h r d  effect of the narrow role given risk assessment that 
is more subtle than the ones already named, but is perhaps the most 
important one. Once a site is selected, given the political realities of the 
situation, the question of the overall acceptability of the risk is more or 
less settled. If a risk assessment is applied at the design level, it may 
consider various modifications to reduce the rlsk in the most cost- 
effective way. However, given its scope and charter, the assessment is 
hghly unlikely to find that  the site cannot be made acceptably safe with 
current technology and so should be abandoned. On the other hand, if a 
risk assessment is applied a t  the site selection level, it would at least be 
feasible t o  rule that none of the sites in the current choice set are 
acceptable. That feasibility arises from the lack of political and economic 
momentum behind any one site, and from the fact that at  least in some 
cases additional sites c ~ u l d  be considered in response to the analysis 
results. The detection of this effect requires interpretation; it cannot be 
definitely documented from any evidence. It nevertheless suggests h a t  
the role given to risk assessment can affect its results. 
Risk assessment does not exist in a vacuum. It is a decision aid in a 
much larger process. Any understanding of current assessment, and any 
suggestions for improvement, requires an understanhng of that larger 
process. As this section has pointed out, that larger process controls the 
role and nature of risk assessment in very basic and important ways. 
CHAPTER 3: 
REVIEW OF THE LITER11TUHE 
Before going into the quantitative and t e c h c a l  details of the dif- 
ferent risk assessment reports (see Chapter 4) we want to compare and 
evaluate the literature in qualitative terms. In Chapter 3.1 we will discuss 
risk assessments that have been undertaken for the sites Eemshaven 
(Netherlands-NL), Mossmorran (United Kingdom-UK), Point Conception 
(USA) and Wilhelmshave n (Federal Republic of Germany--D) with some 
reference to risk assessments for other sites. In Chapter 3.2 we will pri- 
marily &scuss papers that critically reviewed risk assessments and 
present their major points of criticism. 
3.1. RISK ASSESSMENT REPORTS 
In Table 3.1 we try to give a comprehensive overview of the most 
important risk assessment reports rvailable to us including not only the 
reports prepared for the four sites--Eemshaven, Mossmorran, Point Con- 
ception, and Wilhemshaven--but also a few others of particular interest. 
Before discussing some of the aspects of Table 3.1 we want to comment 
on the chosen issues of this table: 
a. Parts of t h e  s y s t e m  cons id e r ed :  Not all reports consider all the main 
parts of an  LXG terminal, namely vessel, transfer and storage tanks. 
In particular, for Wilhelmshaven there are two types of reports. One 
dealing only with vessel operation and LEG transfer, the other deal- 
ing only with the storage tanks. Unfortunately, the latter reports 
cannot be commented on here, because they are confidential. 
b. Concept  of risk: As we already discussed in Chapter 2.2, there is no 
unique definition of risk. Each report should therefore be quite 
specific on what type of risk is analyzed. 
c. E s t i m a t i o n  of p robab i l i t i e s  o f  e v e n t s :  One crucial part of risk assess- 
ment is the estimation of probabilities, unless only the consequences 
are considered. I t  is therefore necessary to see how t h s  problem is 
solved in different reports. Two techniques can assist in performing 
thls task. The e v e n t  t r ee  is a technique to develop a logical sequence 
of events (failures) resulting in unwanted consequences (accidents). 
Event tree analysis can help to  avoid overlooking possible accidents. 
Having identified the possible events (failures), the goal of fauLt t r e e  
a n a l y s i s  is to determine the probability of a specific accident as the 
result of a sequence of basic events (failures) of the system. Fault 
tree analysis evolved in the aerospace industry in the early sixties 
and has since then become a standard technique for systems safety 
analysis. It was also used extensively in WASH-OTH. 
d. Estimation of consequences of events:  It is necessary that the conse- 
quences be stated in terms a decision maker is concerned with. For 
this reason, and because of the definitions of risk typically assumed, 
most reports estimate the consequences in terms of the number of 
fatalities a certain event can cause. However, some reports only 
estimate the physical consequences (e.g., size of a LEG spill as a 
result of a specific event or size of a LEG vapor cloud) and do not 
relate them to number of fatalities. 
e. Estimation of risk: Different estimations are given dependmg on the 
definition of risk employed. In some cases no estimation is given at  
all. 
f .  find findings: As we see it the ideal result of a risk assessment 
report should be the quantification of the risk and its comparison to 
risks from other sources such that the decision making process can 
determine whether the risk from an LEG terminal is high or low com- 
pared to other risks. The ideal comparison is between risks from 
alternatives actually faced in the decision making process: site A vs 
site B, site A vs no site, etc. That risk comparison is the risk assess- 
ment result of most direct usefulness to the decision process. In any 
case, i t  should be kept in mind that decisions concerning the accep- 
tability of the risk from an LEG terminal involve social value trade- 
offs and perhaps political considerations that go beyond the mission 
of the risk assessment and the legitimate authority of technical risk 
assessors. It follows that the final finding of a risk assessment should 
impart information to the decision maker for h m  to use as a basis 
for his decision without making that decision for him. If a risk 
assessment reports that a risk is acceptable, then the techmcal 
assessors have made a judgment that they do not have legitimate 
authority to make, a t  least in the political systems under study here. 
g. Uncertainties in final findings: Due to the little experience with LEG 
accidents there remains a substantial amount of uncertainty about 
the accuracy of the estimations of probabilities and consequences of 
events. Different reports handle t h s  problem differently: Some 
ignore uncertainties completely, some give conservative estimations, 
some perform sensitivity analysis and some give error bounds on the 
quantified risk. 
h. Single Event w i t h  hzghest risk: If mitigating measures to reduce the 
r s k  are undertaken it is interesting to know which event bears the 
hghest risk, as it is often the case that the highest-risk event offers 
the most cost-effective opportunities for mitigation. 
When evaluating the reports one should keep in mind that the differ- 
ences between the reports which become obvious from Table 3.1 can at  
least partially be explained by the fact that these reports were prepared 
and used for different decision processes and therefore each report was 
developed in a way suited to the particular decision process it was to 
serve. 
Obviously the studies that are essentially different from all the other 
reports in Table 3.1 are CREM-UK, BROTZ-D, KRAPPl,Z,3-D, and WSD-D. 
Particularly on the issues concept of risk, estimation of consequences, 
estimation of risk, and final findings they do not fit into the pattern of the 
other works. It cannot be determined whether this is due to different 
scientific backgrounds and standards of the analysts, limited resources 
available to perform the tasks, different decision processes at Mossmor- 
ran and Wilhelmshaven compared to all other sites, or some other rea- 
sons. Whatever the reasons might be we would not consider these four 
reports as examples of very good LEG risk assessment reports, in terms 
of the considerations adopted in our study. 
3.2. IUSK ASSESSMENT REWEWS 
A few reports have already addressed the question of evaluating the 
validity of risk assessment methods. The first major report, often 
referred to as the Lewis report (LEWIS-REX), was not concerned with LEG 
but with the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-OTH). The first significant paper 
specifically reviewing LEG vessel risk assessment was written by Fairley in 
1977 and concerned probability estimation for catastrophe LNG vessel 
accidents (FAIRL-REX). A 1978 report by Schneider (SCHNE-REV) deals in 
great detail with specific questions of safety, like dispersions from LNG 
spills as well as vapor cloud deflagration and detonation. The most recent 
Table 3.1 Comparison of reports on issues. 
c. 1 probabilities 
of events 
Issues Reports 
a. Parts of sys- 
tem con- 
sidered 
b. Concept of 
risk 
c. Estimation of 
c.2 event tree 
analysis used 
TNO1-NL 
vessel, 
transfer, 
storage tank 
risk of multi- 
ple fatalities 
and group risk 
ACTION-UK 
vessel 
group and 
individual risk 
yes, quantita- 
t ive 
yes, quantita- 
tive 
c .3  fault tree 
analvsis used 
d. Estimation of 
consequences 
of events 
e.  Estimation of 
risk 
risks 
1 risks 1 .  
no 
yes, quantita- 
tive in terms 
of fatalities 
societal and 
individual risk 
is low com- 
f .  Final finding 
no 
yes, quantita- 
tive in terms 
of fatalities 
individal risk 
is &h com- 
pared to other 
g. Uncertainties 
in final find- 
risk 
pared to other man-made 
man-made 1 risks 
societal and 
individual risk 
is low com- 
pared to other 
man-made 
ings 
h. S~ngle vent 
individual risk 
is &h com- 
pared to other 
man-made 
risks 
not mentioned 
grounding of 
not mentioned 
with hghest  1 LNGtanks 
Table 3.1. (continued) 
a. 
b. 
C. 
C. 1 
ADL-USA 
vessel 
transfer 
storage tank 
multiple fatal- 
CREM-UK 
vessel 
transfer 
storage tank 
probability of 
an injurious or 
destructive 
event 
only in terms 
of low, very 
low, extremely 
low 
Yes 
yes 
yes, quantita- 
tive in terms 
of fatalities 
yes, quantita- 
tive 
"The risk is 
extremely 
low." 
no 
g. 
h. 
FERC-USA ' SAI-USA 
Yes 
vessel 
societal, group 
ities risk and individual 1 risk 
yes, quantita- 
tive 
not mentioned 
not identified 
vessel 
transfer 
storage tank 
risk of mul- 
tiple fatalities 
and group 
no 1 ves I no 
yes, quantita- 
t ive 
yes, but only 
physical cons. 
(e.g., spill 
size); no esti- 
mation of 
fatalities 
no estimation 
of expressed 
fatalities; esti- 
mation of pro- 
babilities of 
events only 
"No reason to 
doubt that the 
installations 
cannot be 
built and 
operated in 
such a manner 
as to be 
acceptable in 
terms of com- 
munity 
sensitivity 
analysis 
not identified 
yes, quantita- 
t ive 
yes, quantita- 
tive in terms 
of fatalities 
yes, quantita- 
tive 
Pt. Conception 
is a suitable 
site with 
respect to 
vessel traffic 
safety. Risk 
is very low 
disagreement 
among 
experts is 
mentioned 
not identified 
yes, quantita- 
tive in terms 
of fatalities 
yes, quantita- 
t ive 
risk is corn- 
parable to 
risks from 
natural events 
and therefore 
on an accept- 
able level 
sensitivity 
analysis 
not identified 
Table 3.1. (continued) 
I I I 1 storage 
not defined not defined not defined 
a. 
only in terms 
of very low 
KRAPP 1,2,3-D 
vessel 
BROTZ-D 
vessel, 
transfer 
no 
no 
yes, but only 
physical 
consequences 
(e.g., spill 
size); no esti- 
mation of 
fatalities 
no estimation 
~ i v e  
With regard to 
consequences 
and their pro- 
babilities 
there is no 
danger, hav- 
ing in mind 
the relevant 
not mentioned 
WSD-D 
vessel 
not identified 7 
BATTE-OTH 
vessel, 
transfer, 
yes, quantita- 
tive 
no 
no 
no estimation 
given 
no estimation 
given 
no final find- 
ing s 
not mentioned 
only in terms 
of very low 
no 
no 
some quanti- 
tative state- 
ments in 
terms of few 
and many 
fatalities 
yes, quanti- 
tative 
the risk is 
not insignifi- 
cant 
multiple 
fatality, 
societal and 
e r o u ~  risk 
yes, quanti- 
tative 
Yes 
no 
yes, quanti- 
tative in 
terms of 
fatalities 
yes, quanti- 
tative 
risk is 
about the 
same as the 
risk from 
the gas dis- 
tribution 
network 
mentioned considered 
and error 
bounds 
not identified not identified 
given 
rupture of 
transfer 
pipeline 
with 
delayed 
Table 3.1. (continued) 
yes, quantita- 
tive 
HSC-OTH 
vessel, 
transfer 
storage tank 
multiple fatal- 
ity and group 
risk 
yes, quantita- 
t ive 
yes, quantita- 
tive 
KEEN-OTH 
vessel, 
transfer, 
storage tank 
multiple fatal- 
ity, societal, 
group and 
individual risk 
SES-OTH 
vessel, 
transfer, 
storage tank 
multiple fatal- 
ity risk 
no I no no 
not mentioned 
not identified 
presently 
sensitivity considered 
analysis was 1 and error 
yes, quantita- yes, quantita- 
conducted to 
examine 
effects of vari- 
ations of two 
parameters 
not identified 
yes, quantita- 
bounds given 
not identified 
tive in terms tive in terms tive in terms 
of fatalities 
yes, quantita- 
tive 
risk is only 
acceptable if 
suggested 
mitigating 
measures are 
, undertaken 
I yes, quantita- 1 yes, quantita- 
tive I 
risk is below 
those risks 
that the popu- 
lation near the 
terminal is 
exposed to 
tive 
level of safety 
cannot be 
specified 
accurately 
and most comprehensive review of LNG risk assessments was done in 1980 
by the National Advisory Board of the National Academy of Sciences 
(NMAB-REV). In the rest of this chapter we will concentrate on this latter 
report, because it covers the main points of criticism from the other 
reports and raises additional questions. 
The major findings on LNG risk assessment in NMAB-REV can be sum- 
marized in 9 points: 
1. Most reports seem to focus on the low-probability, hgh-  
consequence events. They tend to ignore other important 
events, for example of higher-probability and lower- 
consequence, and so underestimate the overall risk. 
2. Most studies do not consider future traffic patterns (i.e., pro- 
jected ship sizes and traffic density) that may affect predicted 
accident routes. Estimations of probabilities of LNG vessel 
accidents in the vicinity of LNG terminals with a lifetime of a t  
least 20 years ought to account for expected changes of traffic 
patterns over the same period. 
3. In reports that  consider risk-reduction factors, too much credit 
is given to them with apparently arbitrary estimates of their 
effectiveness. Also, these risk-reduction factors are often 
treated as if they are independent of one another, with the 
effects of several risk-reduction factors multiplied to give the 
overall reduction in the accident probability. Such assumptions 
of independence are typically not adequately justified. 
4. Human error is usually not accounted for in the reports. When 
it is considered, human error events are usually treated as if 
they are independent, while experience shows that human 
errors are not independent of one another. 
5. Confidence limits or error bounds for the probability of an LNG 
spill are rarely given. 
6. Differences in the various dispersion models for predicting cloud 
size lead to large differences in the estimation of the conse- 
quences. 
7. The reports rarely discuss uncertainties of the data or the 
results. Instead, the elements in the analyses are presented as 
facts. Therefore, the reports imply greater accuracy in the 
results than is warranted by the current state of knowledge. 
8. In many reports the risk of an LNG terminal is compared to 
other risks. These types of comparison with other risks (e.g., 
auto driving, fires) help to give a feel for the magnitude of the 
estimate. But such comparisons do not and should not imply 
that the LNG risk is acceptable. 
9. Whatever flaws the LNG risk assessments may have, they are 
clearly superior to less systematic approaches in identify~ng 
possible system weaknesses and likely failure modes and 
informing the decision makers on the topic of risk, whch is cer- 
tainly one aspect of the whole decision problem. 
These 9 points can also be taken as a brief introduction into the kind of 
questions we will be dealing with in chapter 4. Although all the above 
points are certainly very important we feel that some should be looked a t  
in greater detail, whch we w~ll do in Chapter 4, some additional points 
should be raised, and taking all these points into account some general 
guidelines can be given as to how to produce a good risk assessment. The 
latter two topics will not be addressed in this report, however, but will be 
discussed in a research report to follow. 
CHAPTER 4: 
ASSESSMENT AND COMPAFUSON 
OF LEG TEXMINAL RISK 
In tlus chapter we will discuss in detail the probabilities and conse- 
quences of different events (failures). The way in which we proceed fol- 
lows along the lines of the reports SAI-USA and BATTE2-OTH. After giving 
a technical description of the four LNG terminals we divide the rest of this 
chapter into three distinct parts. First we consider the estimation of pro- 
babilities of events, then the estimation of the spill size, speed and vapor 
cloud as a result of the failures and finally we consider the consequences 
to the local population by quantifying the overall risk as a result of the 
first two parts, population density and a few other factors. The primary 
purpose of this chapter is to present the results from the risk assessment 
reports in a comparable manner and to &scuss the differences in esti- 
mates of probabilities and consequences between the reports in terms of 
the underlying assumptions of the models used and their plausibility. 
However, as we already showed in Chapter 3.1, not all the reports are 
easily comparable. Some reports do not consider all the events we will be 
discussing. Additionally, some reports do not quantify either the proba- 
bilities or the consequences of events. Therefore, this chapter cannot 
and will not be a complete comparison for all events. Rather, we want to 
give some insight into the risk a t  all the terminals, to show how one 
should go about it if a risk assessment is to be made for Mossmorran and 
Wilhelmshaven, and to identify the open questions in this context. 
4.1. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION OF THE IXG TERMINALS 
In Table 4.1. we give a brief description of the planned terminals a t  
the sites Eemshaven, Mossmorran, Point Conception and Wilhelmshaven. 
As can be seen, Mossmorran is a different type of terminal than the other 
ones. Not only is Mossmorran an export terminal, but the exported gases 
are mainly propane and butane, while LNG consists mostly (approxi- 
mately 90%) of methane. As far as one can tell from the available risk 
assessment reports, the technical layouts of the different terminals are 
much the same. Not only are the LEG vessels similar (except in size) or 
even the same, but also the storage tanks and the transfer systems are 
very much the same. On a relative risk scale one can expect that the risk 
increases with the size of the terminal and also with the number of people 
Living (or worhng) withn a certain distance of the terminal. As far a s  size 
is concerned the Point Conception and Wilhelmshaven terminals are 
larger than the other two and Wilhelmshaven has the largest amount of 
total storage capacity, though Eemshaven has the largest individual 
tanks. Population density is particularly low at Point Conception. The 
amount of energy flow through the terminals is quite impressive. Consid- 
ering that large new nuclear reactor units produce approximately 1000 
Megawatts at full power, the energy flows at Point Conception and 
Wilhelmshaven are each approximately comparable to the output of 15 
such nuclear reactor units. 
An overall impression of the location of the terminals can be taken 
from the maps in Figures 4.1-4.4. For alI sites except at Point Conception 
the vessels have to travel through a channel, with populated areas 
nearby. The town of Borkum, for example, is only 1.5 km away from the 
LNG vessel route to Eemshaven and the town of Wangerooge is 3.5 km 
away from the vessel route to Wilhelmshaven. As indicated in Table 4.1, 
other gasses are transferred a t  Mossmorran (mainly butane and propane) 
than at the three other terminals (mainly methane). Some chemical 
differences are shown in Table 4.2, which result in some differences in the 
consequences for the same spill size. We will discuss t h s  in more detail in 
Chapter 4.3.2. 
Overall one could say that on a relative risk scale Point Conception 
could be the least risky terminal, because of its low population density. 
However, this fact might be offset by the fact that Point Conception is at 
the same time the largest terminal in terms of average transfer. The 
Wilhelmshaven terminal, which is about the same size as the Point Con- 
ception terminal, should have a higher risk than Point Conception 
because of its higher population density. But the extent to whch the risk 
at the different terminals differs can only be quantified through a 
detailed analysis, to be presented in the remainder of Chapter 4. 
4.2. EWENTS: THEIR PROBABZLITIES AND RESULTING SPILL SIZE 
One of the most difficult questions of risk assessment is the identifi- 
cation of possible events or failures and the estimation of their frequen- 
cies or probabilities. First of all, because LEG risk assessments deal with 
low-probability events, by definition i t  is nearly impossible to get enough 
historical data to estimate the probabilities in a straightforward manner. 
Rather, one has to build models and rely on data from other presum- 
ably similar systems. As if t h s  were not enough, another important part 
of the risk assessment problem is the identification of events that have 
never occured before that would have serious consequences. It is cer- 
tainly impossible to conceive of all possible events, as one can easily 
demonstrate when looking at  the invention of new technologies, such as 
new airplanes. Tbs problem was also acknowledged in the Lewis Report 
(LEWIS-REV), where it was stated that: 
"It is conceptually impossible to be complete in a.mathematica1 
sense in the construction of event-trees and fault-trees; what 
matters is the approach to completeness and the ability to 
demonstrate with reasonable assurance that only small contri- 
butions are omitted. This inherent limitation means that any 
calculation using this methodology is always subject to revision 
and to doubt as to its completeness." 
We therefore do not and cannot claim that the events considered here are 
a complete set of possible events. However, it can be said that t h s  set of 
events includes all events that  were thought of in the risk assessment 
literature, e.g., TNO 1-NL, SAI-USA, ADL2-USA and BATTE2-OTH. 
As is usually done in the literature we subdivide the events into three 
groups: vessel accidents, failures of the transfer system and events lead- 
ing to a rupture of a storage tank. 
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Table 4.2. Some properties of liquefied energy gases. 
Property Me thane Ethane Propane Butane 
Boiling Point -163' -88' -42' -1 O 
Specific 0.466 0.546 0.585 0.601 
gravity a t  
boiling point 
Vapor densi- 
ty a t  o0 ( k r  
= 1.0) 
Auto- 
Ignition 
tempera- 
ture 
Flammable 5-15% 3- 13% 2.2-9.5% 1.8-8.4% 
limits (con- 
centration 
in air) 
Gas-t o-liquid 650 
volume ratio 
(gas a t  oO, 
liquid a t  
boiling 
point) 
Content of 6444 
energy of 
lm3 liquid 
a t  boiling 
point in 
kilowatt- 
hours 
All temperatures in degrees Celsius. 
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F i g u r e  4 . 4 .  Map of Wilhelmshaven. 
4.2.1. Vessel Accidents 
Basically, there are two types of models used to estimate certain 
accident probabilities, as described by Philipson (PHIL-GEN). First, one 
must differentiate between two important parts of an accident-one part 
belng the probability of an accident and the second part  being the proba- 
bility of an LEG spill given that an accident occurred. 
To establish estimates of the probabilities of accidents two methods 
are used in the literature: 
1 .  Statist ical Inference: Estimates are computed by using historical 
data, first for a larger class of shps ,  such as oil tankers, and then 
modifying the estimates to account for the anticipated differences in 
LEG ships and their operations at  the specific harbor. This is done, 
for example, by employing judgment and by assessing the proportion 
of past accidents that would not have occurred if various capabilities 
of the system had been in place. Examples of this type of analysis 
are LIGT-ACC and FERC-USA. 
2 .  Hznematic Modeling: In SAI-USA ship collisions are analyzed by 
assuming ship motions to be random in a zone of interest 
corresponding to the short interval of time preceding an accident. A 
kinematic model provides the expected number of collisions per year 
under t h s  assumption for a harbor with specific characteristics of 
configuration and traffic. A calibration to the actual average condi- 
tions of seven harbors is then made by scaling the model to fit actual 
past collision frequencies in these harbors. 
In a similar manner the probability of a spill given an accident is either 
estimated from data taken from other but similar tankers or computed 
via a model by taking the physical characteristics of the s h p  hull and the 
tanks into consideration. 
Considering specifically the statistical approach, the estimates are 
criticized by Fairley (FAIRL-REV), who claims that due to remaining 
uncertainties the actual probability might be substantially hgher .  The 
types of accidents estimated by the above mentioned methods are colli- 
sion, grounding and ramming. Three other types of accidents have to be 
considered: airplane crash, meteorites, and internal system failure. The 
estimation of all the probabilities due to the six different types of events 
are given in Table 4.3. We now discuss how the different reports derived 
their estimates: 
1. Collison, g r o u n d i n g  a n d  r a m m i n g :  Only SAI-USA uses a kinematic 
model, calibrated by statistical evidence, whle in all the other 
reports, statistical inference alone is used. In NMAB-REV the work of 
LIGT-ACC and REES-ACC is qualified as outstanding compared to the 
other works considered in NMAB-REV. TNO1-NL relies on LIGT-ACC 
and ADL2-USA relies on REES-ACC. The work of KRAPP1,2,3-D again 
relies strongly on TNO1-NL. One can certainly not expect the proba- 
bilities of ( I ) ,  (2) and (3) of Table 4.3 to be equal between the sites. 
However, the difference between FERC-USA and SAI-USA is certainly 
hard to understand. Unfortunately, CREM-UK does not give any esti- 
mate a t  all on the topics of Table 4.3. We therefore excluded t h s  
report from the table. The only other report, ACTION-UK, takes its 
estimation directly from HSC-OTH, whch was confirmed by MARSH- 
UK, who reviewed ACTION-UK. 
2 .  Other failures: Only ACTION-UK, ADL2-USA, SAI-USA and BROTZ-D con- 
sider other hazardous events. The estimations of (4) and (5) are 
straightforward from hstorical data. Only ACTION-UK, ADL2-USA and 
SAI-USA consider internal system failure. ACTION-UK, using data 
taken from HSC-OTH, attribute their internal system failure rate to 
fire/explosion while the LEG vessel is a t  the berth. The reasons for 
the fire/explosion remain unclear. The systems failures in the other 
reports are due to metallurgical failure. 
Overall, it should be mentioned that  the estimates given in Table 4.3 are 
not always taken directly from the reports. In some cases the estimates 
were adjusted to take additional data into account. SAJ-USA used more 
s h p s  with larger tanks than currently planned, so the probabilities and 
spill sizes were reduced accordingly. FERC-USA only considered spill 
sizes of 25000mS in their report although they stated the data for smaller 
spill sizes as well. This was added in Table 4.3. KRAPP1,2,3-D produced a 
variety of different results by using different accident reduction factors, 
ranging from 1.0 to 0.05. Because the latter factor was not based on any 
stated reasoning, we used the factor 1.0, which was used in KRAPP1-D. 
Table 4.3 Estimation of LEG vessel failures. 
TNO 1-NL 
(3) Probability of ramming that 
can lead to a spill per ship 
approaching the terminal 
(1) Probability of collision that  can 
lead to a spill per ship 
approaching the LEG terminal 
(2) Probability of grounding that  
can lead to a spill per ship 
approaching the LEG terminal 
(4) Probability of missile or air- 
plane crash causing a spill per 
year 
( 5 )  Probability per year of a 
meteorite falling on a specific 
area of one square meter  
2 .8 .10-~  
2.5. 
( 7 )  Number of ships per  year 1 54 
(6) Probability of internal system 
failure 
(8) Deck-size of ship in m2 (max- 
imum) I 12000 
- 
(10) Size of one tank (maximum) in 25000 
"73 
(9) Length of stay of loaded ship in 
the vicinity of the terminal (in 
years) 
ACTION-UK 
1.5 .10-~ 
includes (2) 
and (3) 
3.2. I o - ~  
8 0 
6600 
1201.0 
- 
ADL2-USA 
-  
see (14) 
I 
190 
12000 
2. I 0-3 
25000 
FERC-USA 
6. 
4.1 o - ~  
3.1 0-4 
- 
- 
190 
12000 
2.1 0-3 
25000 
SAI-USA 
0 
0 
4. 
~ 
3.3.10-'" 
1 . 0 . 1 . 0 - ~ ~  
190 
12000 
2.1 0-3 
25000 

f ind ings :  
a. Compared to the probability of collision, grounding and ram- 
ming, the other events are rather unlikely (except for the inter- 
nal failure in ACTION-UK). 
b. The differences between the three reports for Point Conception 
are substantial (between and for 10,000 to 25,000m3 
spills) and cannot be explained. 
c. Although the traffic patterns at Eemshaven, Mossmorran and 
Wilhelmshaven are quite different, they all come up with a total 
probability of the order loB, but the spill sizes differ and are 
not even defined for Wilhelmshaven. 
4.2.2. LEG Transfer System Rupture 
Ttus failure is generally not considered to be very critical (compared 
to vessel accidents and storage tank failures), because the overall risk 
deriving from it is relatively low. Therefore, t h s  failure is not even con- 
sidered in many reports. Possible events that can lead to a transfer sys- 
tem rupture are: meteorites, earthquakes, ramming, airplane crash and 
internal system failures. The overall probabilities for &fferent spill sizes 
are given in Table 4.4. Because the consequences of an LEG transfer sys- 
tem rupture are not worse than those from a spill after a vessel accident 
(for the same spill size), it is obvious that the risk does not add signifi- 
cantly to the overall risk, due to the small spill sizes. 
Table 4.4. Estimation of LEG transfer systems failure 
TNO1-NL CREX-UK SAI-USA BROTZ-D 
Probability of spill size per year 
0 low 1.6.1 o - ~  very low 
0 0 no spill very low 
1.0. 0 size given, 0 
but small 
4.2.3. Storage Tank Rupture 
Finally, we consider the events wbch could create the largest spill, 
the rupture of storage tanks. In the literature, it is assumed that  one of 
the following events can cause a rupture: severe winds, airplane and mis- 
sile crash, meteorites, earthquakes, internal system failure and 
accidents a t  other chemical plants nearby. In Table 4.5 we report the 
estimates of the different events for the terminals. 
The estimate of TNO1-NL is taken from hstorical data of a peak- 
shaving LNG plant. CREM-UK only qualify the probability as "remote," 
without reference to how thrs qualification was produced. ADLZ-USA and 
SAI-USA derive their estimates from historical data on weather condi- 
tions, earthquake frequencies and frequencies of airplane crashes. The 
probabilities for internal system failure-due to metallurgical failures-- 
were derived through a technical analysis, considering the material and 
the variations of the temperature of the material causing fatigue or 
stress. BROTZ-D estimates the probability of an airplane hitting one of 
the six tanks from hstorical data from Germany. No other probability 
estimates for Wilhelmshaven are available for discussion, because parts of 
the reports are confidential. No spill sizes are given in BROTZ-D, but after 
an airplane crash into a storage tank, a complete rupture of this tank can 
be assumed as a conservative estimate. 
All storage tanks are placed within containment basins capable of 
c o n t a i n q  all the contents (in liquefied form) of the tanks. All credible 
failure scenarios assume that these containment basins will not break 
and therefore all spills remain within these basins. 
Only SAI-USA considers probability of rupture of more than one tank 
a t  a time, due to a common cause. The maximum credible spill is then 
considered as a rupture of all three storage tanks (each consisting of 
??,500m3) a t  a time. SAI-USA adjust their probabilities to the fact that 
the tanks are empty approximately 40% of the time. 
Findings : 
1. The probability of a storage tank rupture is estimated for all 
sites (except Mossmorran and possibly Wilhelmshaven, where 
not all reports are available for comment) of being on the order 
of per year. 
2. As a conservative assumption the spill size is generally assumed 
to be a t  least the complete contents of one tank. CREM-UK only 
assume 15% of the contents of one storage tank to be spilled. 
BROTZ-D does not estimate the spill size. 
3. TNO1-NL, ADL2-USA and SAI-USA have implicitly or explicitly 
considered the events given in Table 4.5. In CREM-UK it is not 
clear what failures have been considered. For Wilhelmshaven we 
cannot make a statement, because of the unavailability of some 
reports. 
4. There are no major differences in the estimates, except for (2) 
between ADL2-USA and SAI-USA. The reason for t h s  difference 
is unclear, because ADL2-USA claims to derive its estimate of (2) 
from SAI-USA. 
5. Common cause failures causing more than one tank to rupture 
are only considered by SN-USA. 
4.3. PHYSICAL CONSEQUENCES OF LEG SPILLS 
4.3.1. General Remarks 
We have so far &scussed the probabilities of different spill sizes that 
result from failures of parts of the system. Before we can quantify the 
number of fatalities certain spill sizes can cause, we have to discuss what 
happens to the spilled LEG and how it can cause fatalities. 
There seems to be agreement that only ignition and consequent 
rapid burning or detonation of the spilled LEG can have consequences to 
Life and limb, because of thermal radiation and blast effects. 
Table 4.5 Estimation of storage tank failures. 
T N O  I-NL CREM-UK I A D L Z - U S A  I SAI-USA I B R O T Z - D  
(1) Probability of different spill sizes per year due to storm 
and waves 
0< s 80000m3 0 
80000< 1 100000m3 
I O O O O O <  s 150000m3 
(2) Probability of different spill sizes per year due to air- 
plane crash, missiles and meteorites 
0< 80000m3 
80000< s 100000m3 
100000< s150000m3 
(3) Probability of different spill sizes per year due to earth- 
quakes 
(5) Probability of different spill sizes per year due to internal 
system failure 
0< s 80000m3 
80000< s100000m3 
100000< s 150000m3 
0< 1 80000m3 
80000< s 1 00000m3 
100000< s 150000m3 
150000< s230000m3 
(4) Probability of different spill sizes per year due to nearby 
chemical plants 
0< 5 80000m3 
80000< s 100000m3 
100000< s 150000ms 
- 
- 
- 
- 
(6) Overall probability e r  year 
- 
- 
- 
0< < 9000m 
9000< 1 80000m3 
80000< s100000m3 
100000< 1 150000m3 
150000< <230000m3 
5.2.10-" 
3.8.10-61 - 
- 
- 
- 
very 
unlikely 
and no spill 
size given 
0 
0 
0 
2. 
0 
-lo-' 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0 
0 
0 
]510-5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
8.10-' o 
0 
4.7.10-' 
3.8.10-' 
"remote" 0 
0 1 
0 
0 
0 
- 
- 
- 
Looking at  Table 4.2 it is clear that LEG will immediately start  to 
vaporize after a spill resulting in a vapor cloud. This vapor cloud will then 
travel downwind and disperse. If there is no ignition, eventually all parts 
of the cloud will reach the lower flammability limit of concentration, 
below which it cannot be ignited. To estimate the effects and probabili- 
ties of ignition it is therefore necessary to estimate the size of the vapor 
cloud and the downwind travel distance of the part of the cloud that 
retains a concentration above its lower flammability limit. 
We will first discuss the size of the vapor cloud, whch depends on the 
spill size, on meteorological conditions, and on whether the spill is on land 
or on water. We will then discuss the estimates for the ignition probabili- 
ties a t  different sites and for different events. 
4.3.2. Vaporization and Dispersion of LEG after a Spill 
Among all topics of LEG risk assessment the question of how LEG 
behaves after a spill has attracted the most scientific interest. So far, 
empirical data includes only data for spills up to 50m3 for an LNG spill on 
land and to 200m3 for an LNG spill on water. The prediction of behavior of 
large spills has therefore had to rely on theoretical models, whch are not 
easy to validate. Predictions &ffer for large spills but produce good esti- 
mates of the observed spills. 
Given the amount of effort undertaken in t h s  still very active 
research area, we do not intend to present a complete review of the exist- 
mg models. Rather we want to  discuss some of the major findings of 
reports which have already reviewed the models, to present the predic- 
tions used in the different risk assessment reports and to give some idea 
of what seems to be plausible predictions. 
4.3.2.1. Spills on Sea 
Immediately after a spill, LEG will s tart  to vaporize. The first ques- 
tions are how long it will take until all the LEG has vaporized and how 
large the vapor cloud will be at  that time. There are two types of models 
on those questions, one assuming an instantaneous release of LEG--so- 
called puff models-the other assuming steady release over a certain 
period of time--so-called plume models. The puff models predict a vapor 
cloud of cylindrical shape with a radius equal to  the radius of the LEG 
pool. For different LNG spill sizes and pool sizes, vaporization time and 
vapor cloud size immediately after all liquid has vaporized are given in 
Table 4.6, which was taken from H U 1 - D P  and FERC-USA. 
Table 4.6. Prediction of initial LNG vapor cloud size following 
&fferent spill sizes on water. 
4000 m3 spill 
a. b. c. d. 
Mode 1 Pool Vaporiza- Vapor cloud Vapor cloud 
radius tion time radius height 
Puff Models 
A. 1 Ray /Kalelkar 
(used by Germeles- 189 2.8 189 9 
Drake and CHRIS) 
A.2 J.Fay 197 2.9 197 8 
A.3 Hoult 189 2.5 189 9 
A.4 Ottermann 195 4 195 8 
A.5 Muscari 232 3.4 232 6 
Plume models 
B.l Burgess et  al. - - - - 
B.2 Feldbauer et  al. - - - 
B.3 U.S. Federal Power - - 
- - 
Commission 
Note: Radius and height are in meters and time is in minutes. 
Model 
25000 m3 spill 
a. b. c. d. 
10000 m3 spill 
a. b. c. d. 
100000 m3 spill 
a. b. c. d. 
For the prediction of the vaporization, meteorological data is not 
important. Ths however changes when the behavior of the vapor cloud 
has to be predicted. There are two parameters which are important: 
atmospheric stability and wind speed. The relation of atmospheric stabil- 
ity to weather conditions is shown in Table 4.7. 
Table 4.7 Relation of Atmospheric Stability to Weather Conditions. 
Niqht t ime Cond i t i ons  
Su r face  wind Daytime I n s o l a t i o n  Thin Overcast o r  L 4/8 5 3/8 
speed,  h / h r  S t r o n g  Moderate S l i g h t  c l o u d i n e s s +  c l o u d i n e s s  
7.2 A-B B  C  E  F  
14.4 B  B-C C  D E 
21.6 C  C-D D D D 
>21.6 C  D D D D 
A--Extremely u n s t a b l e  c o n d i t i o n s  
B--Moderately u n s t a b l e  c o n d i t i o n s  
C--Sl ight ly  u n s t a b l e  c o n d i t i o n s  
>-Neutra l  c o n d i t i o n s *  
E- -S l igh t ly  s t a b l e  c o n d i t i o n s  
F--Moderately s t a b l e  c o n d i t i o n s  
+The deg ree  o f  c l o u d i n e s s  is  d e f i n e d  a s  t h a t  f r a c t i o n  o f  t h e  
sky above t h e  l o c a l  a p p a r e n t  ho r i zon  which i s  covered  by 
c louds .  
*Appl icable  t o  heavy o v e r c a s t ,  day o r  n i g h t  
In HAV3-DP the downwind distance of a flammable vapor cloud (above 
lower flammability limit) was predicted using different models. These 
results are shown in Table 4.8. Although the differences in the predic- 
tions of the different models in Table 4.8 seem to be great, one has to 
bear in mind that the predictions were made for different atmospheric 
stabilities. 
Also, as is pointed out in ADL2-USA, these predictions are only valid 
on water, because specific landscapes can have different effects on the 
dispersion of the vapor cloud. 
The overall assessment of the models in HAV3-DP was that the 
Germeles-Drake and the SAI models are the most plausible. Looking now 
at the reports, ADLZ-USA used the Germeles-Drake model, SAI-USA used 
the SAI model, ACTION-UK used the Feldbauer et al. model, while the 
other reports used their own models not mentioned in Tables 4.6 or 4.8. 
Table 4.8. Maximum downwind distance of a flammable vapor cloud 
following a 25000m3 spill of LNG onto water, given wind speed of 8km/hr 
Model 
Germeles and Drake 
(Cabot Corporation) 
Atmospheric 
Stability 
CH Rl S 
(U.S. Coast Guard) 
Distance (km) 
from spill point 
Burgess et al. 
(U.S Bureau of ~ i n e s )  
Very Stable 
Stable 
U.S. Federal Power 
Commission 
Feldbauer e t  al. 
(American Petroleum Institute) 
*Range presented to indicate vaporization uncertainty. 
Slightly Unstable-C 
The predicted downwind distances, taken from the different reports, 
are listed in Table 4.9. Although the predictions depend on spill size, 
atmospheric stability and wind speed, not all reports give downwind dis- 
tances for all combinations of these three parameters. It should also 
again be noted that these predictions are valid primarily over water, 
where the landscape does not influence vapor cloud dispersion in a 
specific way. One could expect that vapor cloud dispersion is faster over 
rough landscape, except in the case of propane and butane vapor, whch 
could accumulate in low area due to their h g h  density. 
In discussing Table 4.9 one has to bear in mind that ACTION-UK is 
considering LPG, which has a lower flammable limit of approximately 2% 
in air, in contrast to 5% for LNG. Because ACTION-UK takes all its infor- 
mation from HSC-OTH, whch uses the Feldbauer e t  al, model to predict 
LNG vapor cloud dispersion, the greater distances are not surprising. 
Atmospheric stability E in combination with a wind speed of B km/hr is 
used for ACTION-UK because that is claimed to be the worst case. CREM- 
UK is not considered because the report does not give any estimate of 
vapor cloud behavior. 
Even without considering ACTION-UK, the differences between studies 
are substantial. Whle SM-USA and BROTZ-D predict relatively short dis- 
tances, ADL2-USA and FERC-USA are comparable in their prediction of 
large distances. It is also worth noting that the distance increases with 
decreasing wind speed in FERC-USA, whle for SAI-USA distance decreases 
with decreasmg wind speed. Also the results of Table 4.9, taken from the 
various reports do not seem to be completely consistent with Table 4.8, 
taken from HAV3-DP--a point we cannot explain. 
Because the models of TNO1-NL, FERC-USA, ACTION-UK, and BROTZ-D 
were not reviewed, we cannot make a statement on their validity. In 
HAV2-DP the models of ADL2-USA and SAI-USA were compared. It is con- 
cluded in HAV2-DP that the predictions of the two models show agreement 
within the uncertainty ranges. In other words, given the present state of 
knowledge both models could be correct. 
mndings: 
1. The available reports indicate that there remains substantial uncer- 
tainty in the maximum distance reached by the flammable region of 
an unignited vapor cloud. 
2. Although Table 4.8 indicates that there are models that predict 
longer distances than the model of Germeles and Drake, HAV2-DP 
and HAV3-DP suggest that the Germeles and Drake model is one of 
the most plausible models and therefore is a reasonable conservative 
model. This should, however, not exclude the possibility that 
downwind distances could be longer than those predicted by Ger- 
meles and Drake. 
Table 4.9. Maximum downwind distance of a flammable vapor cloud 
following an instantaneous spill of LEG onto water. 
. 
1 
Report 
ACTION-UK 
ADL2-USA 
ACT1 ON-UK 
BROTZ-D 
TNO 1-NL 
ADL2-USA 
FERC-USA 
SAI-USA 
Spill Size 
in m3 LEG 
800 
1000 
20000 
20000 
25000 
25000 
30000 
37500 
Downwind 
Distance in km 
4.7 
0.4 
2 
3 
5 
19 
3.5 
' 2.3 
3.3 
10 
1 
7 
10 
2 0 
0.5 
0.5 
0.6 
4.2 
4.9 
5.9 
7.8 
9.2 
11.3 
16.1 
21.6 
27.1 
1 
2 
3.5 
6 
Atmospheric 
Stability 
E 
A 
D 
E 
F 
E 
during night 
only 
A-F 
D 
E,F 
A 
D 
E 
F 
A 
D 
E 
F 
A,D,F 
A,D,F 
A,D,F 
A,D,F 
Wind Speed 
in km/hr 
8 
25 
2 1 
19.8 
10.8 
B 
all wind 
speeds 
all wind 
speeds 
- 
-- 
25 
21 
19.8 
10.8 
25 
16 
9 
25 
16 
9 
25 
16 
9 
25 
16 
9 
0 
11 
25 
54 
ACT1 ON-UK 
SM-USA 
ADL2-USA 
Spill Size 
in m3 LEG 
50000 
64000 
88000 
125000 
Atmospheric 
Stability 
Wind Speed 
in km / hr 
Downwind 
Distance in km 
4.3.2.2. Spill on Land 
Although possibly larger in size, spills on land are generally con- 
sidered less dangerous than spills on water. The first reason for this 
assumption is that spills on land are confined spills, because the storage 
tanks are surrounded by dikes, which are generally considered not to 
rupture. The second reason is that the vaporization rate of LEG on land is 
slower than on water. This vaporization rate can be described by (see 
NMAB-REV) 
vaporization rate , F 
- -  
area of substrate contacting LEG c t  
where t is the time after spill and F is a parameter characteristic of the 
substrate contacting the LEG. Only TNO1-NL, ADL2-USA and SAI-USA con- 
sider vapor cloud behavior after a spill on land. In Table 4.10 we list their 
estimates. Again the rLfferences between ADL2-USA and SAI-USA are sub- 
s tantial. 
The small vaporization rate given in TNO1-NL is due to the fact that 
the dikes surround the storage tanks at a small distance (some meters) 
from the outer wall of the tank. For that reason NMAB-REV suggests 
further research to examine more carefully the results expected from a 
large spill on land, especially for the case of low dkes  some distance from 
the tank, and to compare the effectiveness of such dikes with the effec- 
tiveness of high, close-in dikes. Point Conception is planned to have low 
dikes, while the plans for Eemshaven are for high, close-in dikes. 
Wilhelmshaven and Mossmorran are p1annm.g dikes similar to those at  
Point Conception. 
Table 4.10. Downwind distance of a flammable vapor cloud 
following an instantaneous spill of LNG onto land. 
Report Spill size in Atmospher- Wind speed Downwind 
m3 LNG ic stability in km/h  &stance in 
km 
TNO 1-NL 150000 - - - 
Only 330 m3 will vaporate during first 10 minutes 
after spill, slowing down after t h s  time 
SAI-USA 
4.3.3. Qnition of Vapor Clouds 
Although the vapor cloud is not toxic it can have some effects even if 
not ignited. These effects on people are mainly skin irritation (because 
the vapor cloud is very cold) and sulfocation problems, because if the 
concentration of natural gas is high there might not be enough air for 
breathmg. However, compared to the hazard of an ignited vapor cloud 
these other hazards are considered negligible. 
Ignition probability is composed of two parts. The first part is the 
direct ignition by the event that caused the spill. A s  can be seen from 
Table 4.11 thest! probabilities, depending on the different events, are gen- 
erally high. Ths  is because it is assumed that an event that causes a tank 
to rupture, also creates enough frictional heat to ignite the resulting 
vapor cloud. 
The second par t  of the ignition probability is the probability that  the 
vapor cloud is ignited by some other source given that  it is not ignited 
immediately. Obviously this latter part depends on the availability of 
ignition sources within the flammable bounds of the vapor cloud. 
The probabilities given in Table 4.1 1 are all derived from expert judg- 
ment, though expertise for this particular judgment task is admittedly 
difficult to characterize. Delayed ignition will in general have larger 
consequences, because the vapor cloud increases in size and travels 
downwind. Therefore a high immediate ignition probability will reduce 
the overall risk. In this respect TNOi-NL and ACTION-UK are more con- 
servative in their estimates than the other reports. Certainly, the  igni- 
tion probability can be site dependent. For example, KEEN-OTH points 
out that  the immediate ignition probabthty is estimated at  a h g h  value 
because collisions at  the specific site studied would ,generally involve 
larger vessels carrying dangerous cargoes (such as chlorine). Because 
hstorical data on LNG spills is laclung, the estimated ignition probabili- 
ties can hardly be validated. 
The reports not listed in Table 4.1 1 do not state the ignition probabil- 
ities. Whle CREM-UK and BROTZ-D do not mention ignition probability at  
all, ADL2-USA does mention i t  but does not state the estimates used. 
Table 4.11. Probabilities of immediate ignition following different events. 
Event causing the 
ignition TNOI-NL ACTION-UK FERC-USA SAI-USA BATTE2-OTH KEEN-OTH 
Vessel tank rupture 
caused by: 
collision 0.65 0.66 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9-0.99 
grounding 0.1 - 0.0 - 0.3 - 
ramming - - 0.9 - - - 
missile /airplane - - 0.9 0.9 
meteorite - - - 0.0 - - 
internal failure - 0.9 - 0.0 - - 
Transfer systems 
failure 0.25 - - 0.03 - - 
Storage tank rupture 
caused by: 
storm /waves - - - - - 
airplane /missile / 
meteorites 0.0 - - 0.89 0.9 - 
earthquake - - 0.0 - - 
nearby chemical 
plant - - - - - 
internal failure - 0.0 - - 
FERC-USA, SAI-USA, BATTEZ-OTH and KEEN-OTH use the same model 
for delayed ignition probability. They assume that each source of ignition 
has the same probabilityp of igniting the vapor cloud. Thus the probabil- 
ity Pn that the vapor cloud will have been ignited within n sources 
becomes Pn = 1 - ( l - ~ ) ~ .  Additionally, all the reports using this model 
assume that each person is a source of ignition, because (s)he will use 
facilities (e.g., car, oven, light) that are actual sources of ~ n i t i o n .  The 
differences between the reports are the judgmental estimates of the pro- 
bability p .  Table 4.12 gives these different estimates. 
Table 4.12. Ignition probabilities per  source in case of delayed ignition. 
FERC-USA SAI-USA BA'lTE2-OTH KEXN-OTH 
Probability 0.0025 0.1 0.01 0.01-0.1 
p that each 
person 
within the 
vapor cloud 
ignites the 
cloud 
We present P, for different p and n in Table 4.13. As i t  becomes 
clear from Table 4.13 all assumptions on p can be either conservative or 
non-conservative depending on the number of people (and thus ignition 
sources) within the reach of the vapor cloud. The estimate of FERC-USA, 
for example, is less conservative for Point Conception than the estimate 
of SAI-USA because there are not more than 130 people living withn 10 
krn distance from the LNG facility. Thus the FERC-USA estimate implies 
that  there is a substantial probability tha t  the vapor cloud will not be 
ignited a t  all, while the estimate of SAI-USA implies that  the vapor cloud 
will be ignited with very high probability. On the other hand using the 
model for Wilhelmshaven with 43.000 people living withn 10 km of the LNG 
site (see Table 4.2), the FERC-USA estimate implies that  the vapor cloud 
d l  be ignited, but only after covering more populated area than that  
predicted using the SAI-USA estimate. 
Table 4.13. Probability that a vapor cloud will have been ignited within 
n sources for different values of p .  
The TNO1-NL approach is afferent. It is assumed that a vapor cloud 
is immediately ignited when it arrives a t  a populated area, in particular 
the coast, after a vessel accident, or it is ignited at  sea by another s h p  
with probability 0.5 or it is not ignited at  all. The estimated probabilities 
for Eernshaven are given in Table 4.14. Table 4.14 is computed by consid- 
ering that  another s h p  is not necessarily near the vessel accident site 
thus reducing the probability. The probability of delayed ignition at  the 
coast is computed by considering the tact that not all vapor clouds travel 
to the coast due to different wind directions. 
Table 4.14. Delayed ignition probabilities in TNO1-NL. 
Delayed Ignition a t  coast after collision 0.05 
Delayed Ignition a t  sea after collision 0.2 
No delayed ignition after collision 0.75 
Delayed ignition at  coast after grounding 0.38 
Delayed ignition a t  sea after grounding 0.12 
No delayed ignition after grounding 0.5 
Delayed ignition after transfer system or storage 1 .O 
tank rupture 
Comparing the TNO1-NL estimates with the estimates from the other 
reports, only the estimate range of p =0.01-0.1 in Table 4.13 can explain 
the immediate ignition a t  coast or the 0.5 probability of a ship igniting 
the vapor cloud, given the population density near Eemshaven and the 
number of people on a vessel. I t  thus falls within the range of the esti- 
mates from the other reports. 
4.3.4. Fatalities Caused by Ignited Vapor Clouds 
Effects from ignited vapor clouds can be twofold: thermal effects 
and blast effects. There is no doubt that thermal effects exist. However, 
it is an open question if blast effects due to a deflagration or detonation 
can occur at  all with methane and if so, if the the peak overpressure 
created by a deflagration or detonation is significant enough to cause 
damage. TNO1-NL considers the blast effects as the only serious danger 
and thermal effects are considered as being of comparatively minor 
importance. CREM-UK considers both thermal and blast effect, as is logi- 
cal since the Mossmorran terminal handles materials-butane, propane 
and ethylene--which are known to explode in certain mixtures with air. 
ADLZ-USA only considers thermal effects, because an explosion (both 
deflagration or detonation) of methane is considered very unlikely. 
FERC-USA and SAI-USA again only consider thermal effects. BROTZ-D con- 
siders both thermal and blast effects. In NMAB-REV it is concluded that 
the possibdity of explosions of LNG vapor clouds cannot be ruled out com- 
pletely, although there does not exist empirical evldence for such a possi- 
bility. 
One first step to estimate the percentage of fatalities within certain 
distances from the vapor cloud is to state the level of thermal radiation 
and peak overpressure above which fatalities can be expected. Here one 
has to &stinguish primary and secondary effects. Primary effects are 
fatalities directly caused by thermal radiation and peak overpressure. 
Secondary effects are fatalities caused by fires created from thermal 
radiation and fatalities caused by collapsing buil&ngs as a result of peak 
overpressure. NMAB-REV concludes that thermal radiation at  large dis- 
tances from a major LNG spill can be estimated with reasonable accuracy 
(perhaps within * 30%) from an estimate of the mass burning rate. 
All reports available to us consider only primary thermal effects and 
secondary blast effects. BROTZ-D maintains that primary blast effects 
can be ruled out, because the required peak overpressure has never been 
observed. Secondary thermal effects however are a possibility for people 
sheltered from direct radiation, but are very difficult to estimate. One 
way to include secondary thermal effects is to assume a low radiation 
level as a threshold level for fatalities. 
The only report relating blast effects to fatalities is TNO1-NL. 
BROTZ-D does not consider secondary blast effects. Table 4.15 presents 
the percentage of people killed from secondary blast effects estimated in 
TNO1-NL. It is assumed that the probability of a detonation is 0.01, while 
the probability for deflagration is 0.99. 
Table 4.15. Estimated proportion of fatalities, according to TNO1-NL. 
Percentage of people killed 
after ignition at coast 
after 25000-50000 m3 LNG 
spill on sea 
Percentage of people killed 
after ignition at coast 
after 10000 m3 LNG spill 
on sea 
Detonation 
(Probability 0.01) 
within 3.3km of 
ignition source: 7% 
w i t h  1.2km of 
ignition source: 65% 
Deflagration 
(Probability 0.99) 
within 1.2km of 
ignition source: 1% 
within 2.5km of 
ignition source: 7% 
within 0.7km of 
ignition source: 65% 
within O.8km of 
ignition source 1% 
withn 0.7km of 
ignition source: 1% 
Percentage of people killed 
after ignition at spill site 
after transfer systems or 
storage tank rupture 
resulting in 460 m3 
vaporated LNG 
within 2km of 
ignition source: 7% 
within 0.8km of 
ignition source: 65% 
Table 4.16 Effects of different radiabon levels 
- - lower fatality 
level 
Radiation 
level 
4.7kw/m2 
17.7 kw/m2 - - - lower fatality 
I CREM-UK ADL2-USA FERC-USA SAI-U SA 
Exposure time: Exposure time: Exposure time: 
30 sec. 10 sec. 5 sec. 
lowerlevel lowerfatality - - 
of pain on level 
skin 
The estimated effects of different radiation levels are stated in Table 
4.16. Given that the radiation level can be described by the function (see 
ADL2-U SA) 
where I is the radiation level and X is the distance from the center of the 
fire, Table 4.16 implies that the distance from the center of the fire to 
the lower fatality level is about twice as large in ADL2-USA than in FERC- 
USA and SAI-USA. CREM-UK and BROTZ-D do not give a lower fatality level. 
ADL2-USA and FERC-USA consider only the case when ignition of the 
vapor cloud occurs shortly after the beginning of the spill, when the vapor 
cloud can still be considered cylindrical in shape. In Table 4.17 the dis- 
tance from the center of the fire to the lower fatality level is given for dif- 
ferent spill sizes on sea, taken from ADLZ-USA and FERC-USA. It is clear 
that the distances given in Table 4.17 only apply to people not sheltered. 
Moreover, a conservative assumption is that all people within the dis- 
tances are unsheltered and thus fatalities. 
Table 4.17. Distance from point of spill to lower fatality level in 
case of ignition at  the  spill site on sea for different spill sizes. 
LNG spill volume in m3 
ADL2-USA also considers a fire resulting from a spill of the  storage 
Distance in km to lower fatality level 
of radiation from the point of spill 
1000 
25000 
37500 
50000 
tank into the surrounding dikes and concludes that the distance to the  
ADL2-USA FERC-USA 
0.8 - 
2.9 1 .O 
3.5 1.3 
3.9 1.4 
lower fatality level from the  center  of the fire, the storage tank, is 550m. 
SAI-USA uses a complex model to  compute radiation levels including 
the case of delayed ignition. 
Findings: 
1. The reports &ffer greatly on the  major cause of' fatalities. While 
TNO1-NL assumes all fatalities to be caused by secondary effects of 
vapor cloud explosions, ADL2-USA, FERC-USA and SAI-USA assume all 
fatalities to  be caused by thermal radiation. CREM-UK and BROTZ-D 
do not consider fatalities a s  a result of ignited vapor clouds. 
2. There is also some difference as to the radiation level above which 
there will be fatalities. ADL2-USA adopts the most conservative 
assumption on this topic among the reports. 
3. Of the  studies performed on the  four sites considered in this report ,  
only TNO1-NL and SAI-USA include effects of delayed ignition, in their 
risk calculations. While ADL2-USA and FERC-USA consider delayed 
ignition, they include only immediate ignition at the spill site in their 
calculations. 
4. The effects of LNG and LPG vapor clouds can be different, because it 
is known that LPG vapor clouds explode more easily than LNG vapor 
clouds. Because the thermal radiation is in both cases about the 
same, the potential hazard of an LPG vapor cloud is greater than that  
of an LNG vapor cloud of the same size. 
4.3.5. Effects on Nearby Plants 
The lgnition of an LNG vapor cloud can have effects on nearby plants 
with possibly h g h  secondary effects on the people living or working near 
the plants. Except at  Point Conception there are chemical plants near all 
other LEG terminals. CREM-UK and BROTZ-D considered this point and 
concluded that effects on the chemical plants nearby do not increase the 
overall risk significantly. 
In TNOi-NL it is pointed out that in case of a detonation a nearby 
NH3-storage tank could collapse with inadmissible consequences (the 
lethal dose of N H 3  would reach tens of kilometers). 
4.4. DEMOGRAPHIC AND METEOROLOGICAL DATA 
In addition to the information presented in the previous sections, it 
is necessary to consider meteorological and demographc data for the dif- 
ferent sites. The reason is that wind speed and atmospheric stability play 
an important role in deciding how far a an  unignited vapor cloud can 
travel as discussed before. The wind direction and the population density 
data are necessary to determine how many people are at  risk from any 
given accident. In Table 4.18 we present the relevant data for the dif- 
ferent sites. 
In addition to the populated areas in the vicinity of the LEG terminals 
there is one island, Borkum, in the vicinity of the vessel route to and from 
Eemshaven and another island, Wangerooge, in the vicinity of the vessel 
route to and from Wilhelmshaven. The shortest distance between Borkum 
and the vessel route is 1.5 km, and the shortest distance between 
Wangerooge and the vessel route is 3 km. Two thousand people live in 
Wangerooge with a substantial number of tourists added in summer. For 
Borkum the number of inhabitants is not known to us, but the risk to the 
people of Borkum is considered in TNO1-NL. 
4.5. ASSESSMENT OF RISK TO THE PEOPLE 
4.5.1. Implications of the Definitions of Risk 
Each of the definitions of risk adopted in Section 2.2 addresses a dif- 
ferent aspect of risk from a political and social perspective. The first two 
definitions, probability of exceeding specific numbers of fatalities per 
year and expected fatalities per year, fall in the general category of 
societal risk, involving impacts that fall on society as a whole: those 
directly affected and those observing the effects. The last two definitions, 
probability of an individual in a specific group becoming a fatality per 
Table 4. :8 Meteorological and demographc data. 
Percentage of 
different atmos- 
pheric stabilities 
A,B,C 
D 
E 
F,G 
Percentage of 
different average 
wind speeds 
I 5.5 km/hr 
5.5< I 0.0 km/hr 
8.8< I 1 6 . l  km/hr 
16 . l<  (24.9 km/hr 
24.9< 134.6 km/hr 
34.6< (45.1 km/hr 
45.1 km/hr< 
Percentage of time 
wind is blowing 
from LEG terminal 
to populated area 
(land) 
Population density 
withn a given dis- 
tance of LEG termi- 
nal per km2 of 
land: 
S 2 k m  
S 5 k m  
r 1 0  km 
Populated area 
(land) withn a 
given distance of 
LEG terminal in 
km2 and percen- 
tage of total area: 
r 2 k m  
5 5 k m  
r 1 0  km 
Eemshaven Mossmorrar 
I 
not known, but 
'; probably simi- 
' lar to 
, Wilhelmshaven 
34 (estimated 1 
from data for i 
Wilhelmshaven)~ 
Pt. ~oncep t ion~~i lhe l rnshaven  
I 
11 
6 1 
12 
7 
(the remain- 
ing 9% are not 
given) 
3 not given 1 a , "dominant" 
year and probability of an  exposed individual becoming a fatality per 
year, fall in the general category of individual risk, concerning the 
impacts felt directly. 
Bs k  by the first definition, risk of multiple fatalities, is typically 
displayed as a complementary cumulative probability distribution: proba- 
bility per year that  the number of fatalities will exceed x, vs. x. Such a 
curve is often called a Rasmussen curve, after the director of the Reactor 
Safety Study (WASH-OTH), where it was prominently used. Such a curve 
contains information not available in the individual probabilities: the 
effect of correlations between those probabilites. A Rasmussen curve 
addresses the sensitivity to catastrophe found in the political perspective 
of risk. Consider two facilities that  cause equal numbers of expected 
fatalities per year. In one facility those are bunched into very rare  catas- 
trophes, and in the other they are  spread over common small accidents. 
The former facility may encounter greater political opposition due to  sen- 
sitivity to catastrophe. The Rasmussen curve is the only format used to 
present risk by our adopted definitions that  addresses sensitivity t o  
catastrophe. 
The second definition, expected fatalities per year, is appropriate for 
particular types of analysis, such as cost benefit or risk-benefit analysis, 
where social preference is assumed to be linear in number of lives lost. 
The t h r d  definition, probability of an individual in a specific group 
becoming a fatality per year, could be used to address the sensitivity 
toward equity found in a political perspective of risk. 'Rus measure 
enables one to  determine in some sense how much of the risk is being 
borne by neighbors, campers, boaters, etc. T h s  definition also allows 
separate determinations of occupational and non-occupational risks, two 
risks often treated quite differently in political and social processes. 
Risk as defined by the fourth definition, probability of an  exposed 
individual becoming a fatality per year, is simply an average over the  
group risks measured by the t h r d  definition. This measure is somewhat 
troublesome because it is dependent on the definition of exposed popula- 
tion. If "exposedv1 is defined as having an individual probability of fatality 
of greater than 10-l2 per year, the individual risk will be averaged over a 
region extending not too far from the facility. If on the other hand 
"exposed" is defined with a cutoff probability of loB0 per year, the  indivi- 
dual risk will be averaged over a much larger region, and will be much 
lower. In spite of this shortcoming, individual risk is a measure that  
allows a convenient comparison between the measured risk and more 
routine risks the individual may face: risk due to smoking, driving, etc. 
While such comparisons do not fit into a decision or choice framework 
(who decides between smoking and living near a terminal?), they do pro- 
vide readily understandable benchmarks for scaling the risk of the facil- 
ity. 
The following section presents methods of computation and results 
for each of the four risk measures discussed here. 
4.5.2. Quantification of Risks 
In section 2.2 we defined the four different concepts of risk. Before 
presenting the  estimated risks from the different reports we want to show 
how these concepts of risk are interrelated and what information is 
needed to compute the  different risks. Here we follow closely KEEN-OTH. 
The probability Pr ( z )  of z fatalities per year is calculated from 
PT ( z )  = C PT ( z  (Si).PT (S i )  
i 
where Pr ( z  Si) is the probability of exactly z fatalities resulting from 
event Si and Pr (S i )  is the annual probability of event Si. The expected 
number of fatalities F(Si) due to event Si is calculated from 
These formulas provide the basis for quantifying all of the public risks. 
Societal risk is indicated by the expected number of fatalites F per 
year. This is calculated from 
where the contributions of all possible events are  summed together. 
Individual risk is measured by the annual risk level R to a n  indivi- 
dual in the population exposed to possible risks from LEG. This is found 
by dividing the expected number of annual fatalities by the total number 
N of people exposed, yielding 
This risk level is the  probability that  an exposed individual will be a fatal- 
ity in a specific year. 
If for each accident scenario Si, the  expected fatalities F G ( s i )  to 
individuals in group G is tabulated, the overall expected fatalities FG per 
year to group G is found to be 
The individual risk RG in a particular group G is 
where IVG is the number of people in the group G. 
The risk of mult iple  fatal i tes  is given by the probability that the 
number of fatalities in a given year is equal to or greater than a specific 
level y .  This can be calculated directly from (1). It is simply the sum of 
the probability of y fatalities, y + 1 fatalities and so on. Hence 
In section 4.2. the different events Si as well as their probabilities 
Pr(Si) were considered. In section 4.3 the probabilities Pr(z 1 Si) were 
discussed. 
The resulting estimates of the societal risk, the individual risk and 
the risk of multiple fatalities are given in Table 4.19. No estimates of the 
risks were given in CREM-UK and BROTZ-D. 
Not surprisingly, Point Conception has the lowest risk among the 
three sites. However, as we discussed in the preceeding chapters, dif- 
ferent reports considered quite different events Si. The probabilities 
Pr(z ISi) and Pr (Si) also varied for the same event Si and the same site 
between different reports. 
I t  should also be noted that the estimate of SAI-USA was given for an 
LNG terminaI with more storage tanks and larger ships. Although we 
adjusted the estimates in earlier chapters accordingly to make them 
comparable with ADL2-USA and FERC-USA, this was not done in Table 4.19. 
Therefore, the risk of the smaller LNG terminal currently planned, as it 
would be estimated by the SAI-USA analysis, would be lower than that 
stated in Table 4.19. 
The individual risk depends on the total number N of people 
exposed. That number is not always defined in the same way. Depending 
on how many people are assumed to be exposed at a specific site, the 
individual risk can differ between assessments even when the societal risk 
is the same. 
T a b l e  4.19. E s t i m a t e s  o f  R i s k s  f o r  t h e  D i f f e r e n t  S i t e s .  
S o c i e t a l  R i s k  
( f a t a l i t i e s  p e r  y e a r )  
I n d i v i d u a l  R i s k  
( p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  f a t a l i t y  
p e r  y e a r )  
Number o f  p e o p l e  a t  r i s k  
R i s k  o f  m u l t i p l e  F a t a l i t i e s :  
P r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  number o f  
f a t a l i t i e s  i s  e q u a l  t o  o r  
g r e a t h e r  t h a n  
1 
10 
100 
1000 
5000 
p e r  y e a r  
ACTION-UK 
-- 
7 * 1 0 - ~  
? 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
.TNO1-NL 
4 - 1 0 - ~  
- < 7 * 1 0 - ~  
- >5000 
3- 1 o - ~  
l * 1 0 - ~  
5 * 1 0 - ~  
5 * 1 0 - ~  
3 * 1 0 - ~  
SAI-USA 
1.2*10-~ 
1.4*10-~ 
90 
6.4*10-~ 
3.4910 - 1  1 
PI 
PI 
PI 
ADL2-USA 
7 - 1 0 - ~  
- <9 
- >80 
1 * 1 0 - ~  
1 * 1 0 - ~ -  
6 *  
PI 
(a 
PI 
. 
FERC-USA 
l * 1 0 - ~  
7.8*10-~ 
15 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
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